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Posts Tagged ‘Taliban’

Wikileaks Exposé: Special Forces Counterinsurgency Handbook

Monday, September 6th, 2010

NOTE: In an effort to finally get past the “wikileaks/rape” fiasco I will devote the next few posts to analyzing some of the content the brave folks at Wikileaks have unearthed.

Special Forces Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Handbook:


If anyone wants to really get a handle on what’s going on in Afghanistan, I heartily suggest you look up author Nick Turse’s outstanding piece on Alternet on September 3rd. Entitled: “5 Jaw-Dropping Stories in Wikileaks’ Archives Begging for National Attention,” Turse outlines several of the documents uncovered by the Wikileaks gang that have gotten little to no mention in the mainstream media.

The first one to catch my eye – and the topic for this piece – is the “U.S. Special Forces Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Handbook of 2006.” This document, which according to its introduction, “provides guidance to the commanders and staffs of combined-arms forces that have a primary mission of eliminating insurgent forces…,” offers a stunningly clear example of why the United States will never achieve success in Afghanistan.

The handbook begins by defining insurgent groups as: “…all types of unconventional forces and operations… and includes guerrilla; partisan; insurgent; subversive; resistance; terrorist; revolutionary; and similar personnel, organizations, and methods.” It goes on to state that “Insurgent activities include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature… for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or an occupying power(ital. mine) and using primarily insurgent and informal groupings and measures. An insurgent force is the outward manifestation of a resistance movement against the local government by some portion of the population of an area.”

The problem with this definition of course is that it is broad enough to cover just about any kind of uprising imaginable from roadside bombings and actual armed attacks to peaceful protest marches. Ironically, it is so complete and all encompassing it even includes uprisings that seek to throw off the yoke of an occupying power.

In this case folks, that would be us.

To put this document into perspective, we invade Afghanistan, we throw out the existing government – such as it was – we occupy the country with soldiers, and install a corrupt puppet government. Now, according to this handbook, any citizen of Afghanistan who resists the rule of that puppet government or our military occupation is, by definition, an insurgent and thus a legitimate target for “elimination.”

From a practical standpoint, the fact that this document lumps active fighters such as guerrillas and terrorists together with more passive resisters such as partisans and subversives means “coalition soldiers” are faced with the daily task of having to identify which Afghans among the general population are friends and which are enemies. The assertion that supposed insurgent activity includes acts of a “political, psychological, and economic nature,” means that virtually anything anyone does in the country to change the status quo can be viewed as an act of an insurgency. Given the fact that Afghanistan’s population is around 29 million with support for the Karzai government around 52% and support for America’s soldiers at 38% that’s a shitload of potential “insurgents.”


As if the ambiguity of who is an enemy isn’t bad enough, at times the handbook’s instructions for how to deal with insurgency seem positively schizophrenic. Consider the following two passages:

“Civic action can include assistance to the local population as construction or rehabilitation of transportation and communication means, schools, hospitals, and churches; assisting in agricultural improvement programs, crop planting, harvesting, or processing; and furnishing emergency food, clothing, and medical aid in periods of natural disaster.”

Contrast that touchy, feely, hopey, changy directive with the following:

“Use of fires: Coalition forces enjoy a large advantage in the availability of fires, indirect and aerial, to influence the battle. Using such fires wisely can dramatically affect the outcome of tactical engagements and offer a tool, which with careful use can alter the strategic outcome of the fight against the ACM. (Anti Coalition Militants.)”

So, our soldiers are to take part in agricultural improvement programs, crop planting and harvesting, but only after we’ve burned all the fields to wipe out anyone who takes up arms in an effort to convince us to go home.

It is hard to overemphasize the bizarre nature of this document as a guide for soldiers in the field. In the first chapter the handbook presents the perfectly reasonable statement that: “Resistance movements begin to form when dissatisfaction occurs among strongly motivated individuals who cannot further their cause by peaceful and legal means.”

But where a reasonable, rational person might conclude that the way to defuse resistance movements would be to find some way for those “strongly motivated individuals” to find peaceful and legal means to advance themselves, the Handbook’s solution leaves no doubt that peace is not where its true priorities lie:

“The best method of separating an insurgent force from the populace is by killing the insurgent… The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation are aimed at sudden, complete encirclement that will totally surprise the guerillas… once the encirclement is firmly established, the guerilla force is methodically and thoroughly eliminated.”

In other words, you can shoot, blow up and kill anyone that looks like a militant, but only if you go back and build a post office after you’re done. This is completely crazy. It is a mission that is self defeating from the word go. But the craziest part is yet to come.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is quite literally the battle for hearts and minds of the people fought not with guns or with civic deeds but with PR. (Public relations is an idea that is extremely difficult in a place like Afghanistan where the literacy rate is so low and where the population lives in rural areas with no radios or TVs, much less internet.) But not to worry, the handbook has the answer.

Mobile radio stations. Stations on wheels that can: “…pass messages on to the most remote villages through word of mouth, allowing friendly forces to tailor messages and programming to specific villages…. Currently, radio stations broadcast command information, deception messages, and PSYOP messages that follow approved themes.”

The most bizarre strategy in the PSYOPS arsenal is the “mobile mullah,” a cleric or religious leader friendly to coalition forces who can use his influence to convince local tribal leaders that, for example: “Now is the time to stop fighting and rejoin your families.”

The Counterinsurgency Handbook contains lots of perfectly good strategies for killing people. It quite convincing that the United States Army has the capability to roast and toast anybody in Afghanistan they come across who might be classified as an insurgent. The problem is, by creating such a broad definition for who is a terrorist, the Handbook creates a scenario where soldiers on the ground are faced with the unenviable task of deciding whether the people they meet on a daily basis deserve a daycare center or a daisy cutter.

Perhaps the most telling factoid about the document is the fact that while the word “guerrilla” is used 34 times and “insurgent” is used 151 times, words like “maybe,” “perhaps,” “ethical,” and “moral” do not appear at all. Mass murderers on death row have more questions raised about the rightness of their executions than do the nameless, faceless, Afghans both militant and civilian, who continue to die as a result of this handbook.

For me, this document is absolutely frightening. Not because it lacks morality but rather because it is not unique. The Handbook is merely the latest in a long series of tactical and strategic planning documents for executing a militaristic and imperialistic foreign policy that sees imposing our military might on the world as the United States manifest destiny. Because it defines insurgents as anyone around the world who resists our military might, it is quite simply a manual for perpetual war.

That the handbook doesn’t once question the right or even the wisdom of a foreign policy that calls for our soldiers to fight “insurgencies” wherever they find them is worse than immoral. It represents the ultimate in Hubris. Authors such as Andrew Bacevich and Chalmers Johnson have pointed out, counterinsurgency as a foreign policy was thoroughly discredited in past conflicts like Viet-Nam. And yet here it is, alive and well in the pages of a military handbook that is currently being used in Afghanistan.

The release of documents such as this Handbook is one more example of why Wikileaks and other “whistle blowing” sites like it are so important. It is also one more example of why everyone has a responsibility to open sites like this to see for themselves what is really being done in their names around the world.

In the words of Pierre de Vos: “Secrecy is the enemy of Democracy.”

Tags: afghanistan, AlterNet, COIN, counterinsurgency, Handbook, insurgent, Taliban, Thomas Vincent, Turse, Vincent, wikileaks
Posted in Daily Rant, Ethics, Politics, warfare | 2 Comments »

Let’s Talk Numbers

Friday, August 20th, 2010

According to Jack Kem, the Deputy to the Commander of NATO training mission in Afghanistan, the Afghan army now stands at around 134,000 troops. The number of police stand at 115,000.

Add this to the almost 120,000 NATO troops and their attendant 100,000 private contractors and you get a combined number of around 379,000 souls devoted to fighting the Taliban.

To put this into perspective, according to Major-General Richard Barrons, as of March 3, 2010, Taliban forces are estimated to number about 36,000 insurgents.

379,000 against 36,000. I’m no math genius but this looks to me like the Taliban are out numbered Ten to one.

Or to put it another way, with a population of barely 30 million, there are there is one soldier, policeman or foreign contractor for every 77 people in the country.

And the cost? The US has ponied up more than 335 billion dollars for it’s war effort in Afghanistan so far with no end in sight. This staggering amount of money has been spent on a country where two-thirds of the population live on fewer than 2 US dollars a day.

This is past insanity. It is bat shit crazy.

What is even crazier is that the enemy we are afraid of, al Qaeda, according to our own C.I.A. numbers as few as 50 men!

We have poured a third of a trillion dollars into a dirt poor country to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat’ a rag tag bag of fundamentalist nut jobs who’s greatest “victory” over our country was to highjack four airliners using box cutters and fly them into buildings?

300 billion dollars to hunt down 50 guys? Talk about over kill.

To put it into further perspective, Neighboring Pakistan has recently been the victim of catastrophic flooding that has affected some 20 million people. The US military has offered the use of four Chinook Helicopters and two black Hawk helicopters to support flood relief.

Six helicopters to help relief efforts for 20 million people?

By any measure, the United States has completely lost perspective as to what is important in the world. You can’t defeat box cutters with daisy cutters. Thousands of soldiers can’t defeat terrorists who aren’t there. And drones armed with Hellfire missiles are no use against catastrophic floods.

Tags: afghanistan, Al Qaeda, floods, numbers, pakistan, perspective, soldiers, Taliban, Terrorism, war, warfare
Posted in Daily Rant, Ethics, Politics, warfare | No Comments »

Counterinsurgency

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

Dr. David Kilcullen is a very intelligent man. The well known consultant to the US military has a firm grasp and control of his field (counterinsurgency): i.e. the history, techniques, and yes , the science of dealing with groups of people who are trying to destabilize and overthrow existing governments. There is every reason why Kilcullen has become a go to guy for advice on counterinsurgency by the U.S. Government – first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan.

Every reason except for one:

Every pundit who interviews him, every president, General, and government agency who asks for his advice, all accept as a given that counterinsurgency efforts by the United States are both valuable and necessary. On radio and in print the conversation always starts with the assumption that it is the United States job to try and stabilize the world. Discussions with Kilcullen invariably focus on political, strategic, and operational decisions. No one ever challenges him on whether our counterinsurgency efforts are truly necessary or even wanted by the populations of the countries we occupy with our armed forces.

When asked why we are spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Afghanistan, Kilcullen’s standard answer is to repeat Obama’s mantra that we have to stabilize Afghanistan so that it doesn’t fall to groups like the Taliban who might allow safe havens for al Qaeda.

The other pat phrase Kilcullen falls back on is the phantom menace of loose nukes in the hands of al Qaeda. The argument runs something like this:

*Pakistan has nukes.

*Pakistan is unstable.

*One of the reasons Pakistan is unstable is because of the Taliban.

*Afghanistan is unstable too.

*It also has a Taliban problem.

*Therefore, we have to win against the Taliban in Afghanistan so the Taliban in Pakistan don’t overthrow the government there, gain control over their nuclear weapons and give them to al Qaeda terrorists – (who will of course instantly turn around and use them against the United States.)

This kind of reasoning is so convoluted it starts to sound like the famous South Park episode where Johnny Cochran defends O.J. Simpson by unleashing the “Chewbacca Defense.” “This is Chewbacca. Chewbacca is a Wookie…”

As Kilcullen himself admits, military occupation and counterinsurgency efforts by foreign powers are very difficult and the success rate of such endeavors is historically low. For a variety of reasons the chances of our armed forces being successful at nation building in Afghanistan aren’t very good. Add in the fact that our stated rationale for attempting to stabilize the country, borders on the ludicrous and you have a recipe containing all the savory promise of a cow pie.

Trying to bring peace and stability to a place like Afghanistan by pouring billions of dollars worth of soldiers and weapons and ordnance into the country is like trying to make lousy cake batter taste sweeter by adding cilantro, motor oil, and gorgonzola cheese.

David Kilcullen is a very intelligent man. However, consulting him on counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is a waste of his talents. Asking a great chef to spend his time trying to improve the taste of a lousy soup that someone else has made, is foolish.

Asking him to defend the reason why you have asked him to do such a foolish thing?…

Well, that’s down right criminal.

Tags: afghanistan, Al Qaeda, COIN, counterinsurgency, government, insurgent, Kilcullen, pakistan, Policy, Taliban, Thomas Vincent, Vincent, war
Posted in Daily Rant, Politics, humor, warfare | No Comments »

More, More, Drone War

Wednesday, March 17th, 2010

The continuation of America’s drone war against targets in Pakistan is a crystal clear demonstration of the impotence of the United States with regard to foreign policy. Drone attacks are not a rational policy for solving the problems posed by extremists in the region. Consider the following quote from a New York Times piece by David Sanger reporting on a recent drone attack.

A strike by an unmanned drone last week killed a senior Qaeda commander…

Sounds clear, right? Bold, definitive, lots of action words like strike and kill. To read this first sentence you’d think the U.S. acted decisively to identify an enemy and take him out. Yay team!

The piece goes on to state Hussein al-Yemeni was: “… a senior Qaeda commander who had played a significant role in planning the killing of Central Intelligence Agency operatives in late December at a base in Afghanistan, according to American officials.”

Again, clear and concise. According to a “US counterterrorism official,” positive identification was made. But then we get:

The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, described Mr. Yemeni as an “Al Qaeda planner and facilitator” in his late 20s or early 30s, who had established ties with the Haqqani network, which has planned many Taliban attacks in Afghanistan, and with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Now wait a minute, This supposed “senior al Qaeda commander is a 20 something “facilitator” guilty of “establishing ties” with the Haqqani network. What does that mean? And what was his crime exactly?

His role was described by one American official as a “conduit in Pakistan for funds, messages and recruits, but his real specialty was bombs and suicide operations.”

Okay, that seems clear enough – until we read the next sentence:

It was unclear exactly what role Mr. Yemeni might have played in preparing the Jordanian double-agent, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, also known as Humam Khalil Mohammed, for his meeting in Khost on Dec. 30.

Now let’s recap. We have an unnamed “American Official” who claims we killed a senior al Qaeda commander specializing in bombs and suicide operations who played a significant role in planning the killing of CIA operatives… but no one knows just what significant role he “might” have played in the bombing??? This shit drives me crazy.

The drone attacks are part of a covert program… whose existence is an open secret. The attacks are a key element of an effort to put pressure on Al Qaeda and its leadership, but in recent weeks they appear to have been used to kill those believed responsible for the Khost attack.

In an unusual statement, a senior intelligence official told reporters the deaths (of the CIA agents) would be “avenged through successful, aggressive counterterrorism operations.”

If I am a Pakistani reading this news report I don’t have to read between the lines here. It’s obvious what this is: vengeance. The CIA got caught with their pants down, were given a good sharp kick in the balls and now they are sending drones around in angry swarms to fire missiles at anyone who looks like they’re up to no good. This isn’t a war policy. This isn’t even a viable strategy. It’s a vendetta. This is Hatfields and McCoys. You killed some of our guys so we’re going to lob some Hellfires and take out some of your guys.

But wait, it gets better. Another news report said of the incident:

N. WAZIRISTAN: At least five persons were killed and several others were injured when US unmanned drones fired missiles at a house in Miramshah area of North Waziristan on Monday evening.
According to media reports, US suspected drones fired five missiles at a house in Manay Khan Saraey area of Miran Shah, killing five persons and injuring several others.

And another:

Peshawar: At least five persons were killed in a US drone attack in the lawless north Waziristan tribal region in northwest
The drone fired five missiles at targets near Miranshah, the main town in north Waziristan Agency.
A veterinary hospital was also hit by a missile, sources said.

And this:

PESHAWAR: Five people were killed and six others sustained injuries in a US drone attack on a hotel and nearby veterinary hospital near Miramshah bazaar in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) on Monday.
The drone fired three missiles, which struck a small hotel, where local tribesmen were staying due to daylong curfew clamped by the authorities in the volatile tribal region.

A veterinary hospital?

The point of all this is it doesn’t matter which of these reports is the most accurate. The only important thing here is if we are really serious about wanting to solve the problems of extremists in lawless and volatile tribal areas of Pakistan, the only way it’s ever going to happen is if we bring law and stability to these regions.

Blowing up hotels and hospitals with missiles fired from unmanned drones operated by pilots in a trailer in New Mexico is never going to bring peace to the region. It is never going to make us more secure. It only adds one more piece of evidence to the case that the U.S. is not serious about peace. All it proves is that our government doesn’t give a rat’s patootie about the people of Pakistan.

Hell, we don’t even care about their pets!

Tags: alQaeda, CIA, counterterrorism, Drones, hellfire, pakistan, Policy, Taliban, Terrorism, uav, war
Posted in Daily Rant, Politics, warfare | 1 Comment »

At Last: A Policy That Makes Sense

Saturday, March 21st, 2009

America has signalled a radical new initiative to bring the Taliban into the Afghan political process as part of growing efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war in Afghanistan.

I have been reading with some trepidation, reports of the “review” of Afghanistan/Pakistan policy that the Obama Administration has been conducting this week. Little snippets have been leaked to the press indicating everything from a massive surge of American forces, to 10 billion$ worth of aid to beef up the Afghan military and police forces. Each new speculation seemed to push us closer and closer to a Viet-Nam style quagmire, a quagmire that would de-rail Obama’s domestic agenda every bit as fast as Viet-Nam derailed the Great Society. Now comes a report from the Guardian that in fact Obama may in fact be considering a solution to the Af-Pakistan mess that actually makes sense:
Give the Taliban back a share of the pie.

The US ambassador to Kabul told the Observer that America would be prepared to discuss the establishment of a political party, or even election candidates representing the Taliban, as part of a political strategy that would sit alongside reinforced military efforts to end the increasingly intractable conflict.
America floats plan to tempt Taliban into peace process.

Far from a capitulation, this strategy is a frank realization of a sordid fact that has been evident for some time to those who were willing to take off their neo-con rose glasses and look: The Taliban are already in power. Vast tracts of land in Afghanistan are under Taliban control. Continuing to pour soldiers and money into Afghanistan is even more pointless than pouring billions down the toilet at A.I.G. The reality is that there is only one way that insugencies end.

William Wood, the outgoing US ambassador to Afghanistan, told the Observer that “insurgencies, like all wars… end when there is an agreement”. He said while the US saw “no way there could be power-sharing or an enclave” for the Taliban, “there is room for discussion on the formation of political parties [or] running… for elections. That is very different from shooting your way into power.” The key requirement would be respect for the constitution, Wood added.

In fact, negotiations have already been underway in this regard.

In Kabul, the Observer has discovered at least four attempts at exploratory negotiations between insurgents, their representatives and the Afghan government. One involves Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Islamist warlord and former prime minister, whose militants are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of international and Afghan soldiers and civilians in the east of Afghanistan. Two weeks ago Hekmatyar’s representatives and government emissaries met in a hotel in Dubai, according to Senator Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban minister who is a key intermediary. Rahmani also claims to have been in touch with Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran militant behind a series of bloody attacks in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan.

Other contacts include those between Taliban leaders and President Hamid Karzai’s brother, and those brokered by a group of ex-Taliban leaders now living under amnesty in Kabul including Abdul Salam Zaeef, former ambassador to Pakistan. Nato and EU officials have met Zaeef to discuss Taliban demands. A Pakistan-Afghan “jirga”, or assembly of elders, has established a “reconciliation committee” to “reach out to extremists”.

Will this work? Who knows? But at least it shows that the Obama Administration is willing to face reality as it exists and to change policy to fit the facts (rather than changing facts to fit the policy.) To those who think this kind of change in policy represents dangerous naivite, rest assured, the diplomats are not talking about negotiating with terroriast:

In Kabul, Wood said the upper ranks of the Afghan insurgency had yet to show any “inclination” for reconciliation. Al-Qaida remained “the enemy of the world”, making talks inconceivable.

Comments?

Tags: afghanistan, government, Military, Obama, pakistan, Policy, Taliban
Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

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